

# Revisiting Tax on Top Income

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
Discussed by Johannes Fleck

– Winners, Losers and Policy Reforms after the Euro Crisis –  
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# The European debt crisis and tax changes

## Changes in cyclically adjusted categories of revenue for the euro area aggregate

(percentage of potential GDP)



Start of consolidation: 2009

(ECB, 2017)

- ▶ Increasing (labor) taxes was part of Euro Area fiscal consolidation
- ▶ Additional fiscal adjustments are waiting for the Europeans...
- ▶ Time for a (re)assessment:
  - ▶ What were the effects of the recent tax changes?
  - ▶ How to design future revenue increases?

# The paper in a nutshell (1/2)

## 1. Model: incomplete markets with heterogeneous agents

- ▶ Agents are risk averse and value consumption and leisure
- ▶ Agents have corporate and entrepreneurial abilities  $(y_t, \theta_t)$
- ▶ Two generations and life cycle

- ▶ Young decide to work in one of two sectors

$$C: F(K_t^c, L_t^c) = A(K_t^c)^\alpha (L_t^c)^{1-\alpha}$$

$$E: f(k_t, n_t) = \theta_t (k_t^\gamma (l_t + n_t)^{1-\gamma})^\nu$$

- ▶ Entrepreneurs can continue to work or may retire once old
  - ▶ Corporate workers have to retire in old age
  - ▶ Old who have to exit the model re-enter as young
- ▶ Government's parametric tax function

$$T_t(Y_t) = \begin{cases} (1 - \lambda Y_t^{-\tau}) Y_t + \tau_t^{bal} Y_t + \tau_t^k r_t a_t & \text{if } Y_t < Y_H \\ (1 - \lambda Y_H^{-\tau}) Y_H + \tau_t^{bal} Y_H + \tau_t^k r_t a_t + \tau_H (Y_t - Y_H) & \text{if } Y_t > Y_H \end{cases}$$

where  $Y_H$  is the top 1% income threshold

## The paper in a nutshell (2/2)

2. Calibrate model to match data – income and savings in particular
  - ▶ Strategy: adjust transition matrices for abilities  $\pi(y'|y)$  and  $\pi(\theta'|\theta)$  and their grid point values ('superstars')
3. **Effects of changing the tax code?** → Policy experiments I to IV

<i>Objective</i>	$\Delta \tau$ (Overall progressivity)	$\Delta \tau_H$ (Marginal rate top 1%)
Maximize Revenue	I	II
Maximize Welfare	III	IV

- ▶ Revenues comprise federal, state and local and corporate taxes
- ▶ Welfare is measured in consumption equivalent terms

# Contribution

- ▶ Tractable model fitting empirical earnings and savings well
- ▶ Relative to the baseline
  - ▶ Revenue maximization: increase **top 1% marginal tax** more effective; *'fewer distortions because smaller number of entrepreneurs affected'*
  - ▶ Welfare maximization: increase **overall progressivity** more effective; *'wealth share of top 1% same, top 10% decreases, below increases'*
- ▶ Comparisons to similar studies
  - ▶ Badel and Huggett (2015)
  - ▶ Guner, Lopez-Daneri and Ventura (2016)
  - ▶ Kindermann and Krueger (2017)

## My first two comments and suggestions

1. The paper explores a policy question but motivation is scarce
  - Extend non-technical description or focus on a specific story
    - ▶ Does it relate to the current debate on US tax reform?
    - ▶ Can it speak to the issue of entrepreneurial mobility?
2. Some of the model assumptions would benefit from additional details
  - Provide empirical support or show results are robust
    - ▶ Only entrepreneurs allowed to borrow
    - ▶ Returns independent of portfolio size and composition (and activity)

# My last comment and three related suggestions

## 3. Go further in characterizing model properties and results

- 1 → Discuss transitions: can they change your results (or not)?
  - ▶ In general, changing 'tax mix' can have different distributional consequences along the adjustment path towards steady state
- 2 → Further decompose tax reform effect on steady state allocations
  - ▶ Variance of agent's after-tax income and cost of insurance via labor and asset market not invariant to reform
- 3 → Elaborate on elasticities (labor and capital supply, activity)
  - ▶ Sharpens the comparison to papers such as KK 2017; e.g. persistence of their highest earning state much lower
  - ▶ Helps to determine the trade-offs related to changing the tax system; key to understand *why* tax rates are optimal for a given objective

Thanks for your attention